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Abstract
We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that
their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on
price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest store. We
show that when the number of retailers is large enough, the game admits a pure Nash
equilibrium and we construct it. We then compare the equilibrium cost borne by the
consumers with the cost that could be achieved if the retailers followed the dictate of
a benevolent planner. We perform this comparison in term of the price of anarchy,
i.e., the ratio of the worst equilibrium cost and the optimal cost, and the price of
stability, i.e., the ratio of the best equilibrium cost and the optimal cost. We show
that, asymptotically in the number of retailers, these ratios are bounded by two and
one, respectively.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The problem
In his seminal paper Hotelling (1929) considers duopoly models, where two retailers com-
pete by choosing a location and a price. The article is extremely rich in modeling, motivation,
and examples in different areas. The most popular model considered by Hotelling involves
two retailers who want to sell a homogeneous product to consumers who are uniformly dis-
tributed on a segment and make their purchase decision based on transportation costs and
price of the product. The two retailers first simultaneously choose their location on the
interval and then simultaneously choose the price of the product that they sell with the goal
of maximizing their profit. Hotelling claims that, if transportation costs are linear, then a
principle of minimum differentiation holds, that is, the only equilibrium is achieved when
both retailers locate in the middle of the segment. d’Aspremont et al. (1979) show that
there is a flaw in Hotelling’s argument and, since payoffs are discontinuous, the principle of
minimum differentiation actually does not hold. This shows that models where the retailers
can choose both location and price are in general difficult to deal with.
Several variations of the model have been considered. Some of them assume that the price
is exogenous and is the same for every retailer. In this case the competition is based only on
retailers’ location. This model applies for instance to shops that sell products whose price is
exogenously determined, for instance newsstands, pharmacies, or franchises of different types
of services and products, e.g., brand clothes. Models that involve only location have been
used also in political science (see, e.g., Downs, 1957) to explain why in a two-party system
the parties tend to adopt similar political platforms. Some interesting generalizations assume
that set of feasible locations for the retailers is not necessarily a segment. Our contribution
goes in this direction.
1.2 Our contribution
In this paper we consider a model where consumers are uniformly distributed on a network
and a finite number of retailers sell a unique homogeneous good and decide where to set shop.
They can choose any location on the network and their choice is not limited to the vertices.
The number of retailers and the price of the good they sell are exogenous. Each consumer
buys the same amount of goods and decides to shop at the closest shop. Hence, the cost
that a consumer incurs is the distance that he needs to travel to buy the good and the utility
of the retailer is the share of the market that she can conquer, i.e., the mass of consumers
that patronize her shop. This defines a normal form game, called location game where the
players are the retailers.
In the first part of the paper we provide conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria
in location games. In particular we show that for every possible network there exists a
threshold n¯ such that, whenever the number of retailers exceeds n¯, the game admits a pure
Nash equilibrium. The proof of this result is constructive. We also consider special examples
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of networks for which more precise results can be obtained.
In the second part of the paper we turn to analyze how efficient the equilibria of location
games are. This is usually achieved with the price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio of the optimum
social payoff and the social payoff induced by the worst Nash equilibrium. (Koutsoupias and
Papadimitriou, 1999). The price of stability is constructed in a similar way by replacing
the worst with the best Nash equilibrium (Schulz and Stier-Moses, 2003). In both cases the
social payoff is the sum of the payoffs achieved by all players in the game.
A location game is a constant-sum game, therefore, from the retailers’ point of view,
the social payoff is the same for every possible strategy profile. As a consequence, in their
standard form, both the price of anarchy and the price of stability are equal to one.
From the consumers’ point of view, a location game is not constant-sum, that is, the
retailers’ decisions affect the cost incurred by the consumers both individually and socially.
Therefore something interesting can be said by examining the efficiency of equilibria from
the consumers’ viewpoint, i.e., by considering the total transportation cost incurred by all
consumers to reach the closest shop. This is the function that we use to compute the price of
anarchy and the price of stability of a location game. We prove that, for every network, as the
number n of retailers increases, there is a bound on the price of anarchy that is asymptotically
not larger than 2 and a bound on the price of stability that is asymptotically 1. We show
that the bound on the price of anarchy is only asymptotic, i.e., for finite values of n the price
of anarchy can be larger than 2. Moreover the convergence is not monotone: there exist
networks for which the price of anarchy is infinitely often strictly larger than 2 and infinitely
often strictly smaller than 2. The results on the price of anarchy and on the price of stability
are proved using majorization techniques.
1.3 Related literature
As mentioned before, in general finding equilibria in models where both locations and
prices are endogenous is a hard problem. For instance d’Aspremont et al. (1979) use
quadratic transportation costs to obtain an equilibrium with two retailers. Interestingly
enough, in this equilibrium the two retailers want to locate as far as possible from each
other.
To overcome these issues, some papers consider pure location models with exogenous
prices. For instance, Eaton and Lipsey (1975) study pure Nash equilibria for location games
on the segment for an arbitrary number n of retailers and they show that, when consumers
are uniformly distributed, an equilibrium exists for any n 6= 3. A similar phenomenon,
where equilibria exist for small and large values of n, but not for intermediate values, will
be studied in Subsection 5.3 for consumers distributed on a star. Some papers consider
consumers distributed on a plane. For instance, Lo¨sch (1954) and Bolloba´s and Stern (1972)
show that a strategy profile that splits the plane into hexagonal domains of attraction is
socially optimal for the consumers. Salop (1979) considers a model with two retailers, where
consumers are distributed on a circle. This assumption simplifies the analysis with respect
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to the case of the interval, by eliminating the corner effects. Eiselt and Laporte (1993) find
pure Nash equilibria when three retailers locate their shops on a tree.
Some papers focus on mixed equilibria in location models. Shaked (1982) finds a mixed
equilibrium for the case of three retailers on the segment. Osborne and Pitchik (1986) study
mixed Nash equilibria for location games on a segment under general assumptions on the
consumers’ distribution and they show that, as the number of retailers increases, the mixed
strategy in the symmetric equilibrium of the game tends to mimic the distribution of the
consumers. A similar phenomenon is studied in Nu´n˜ez and Scarsini (2016) for retailers whose
finite choice set is a subset of a general compact metric space.
Closer to the scope of our paper, a few authors consider location models on a graph.
For instance Du¨rr and Thang (2007) and Mavronicolas et al. (2008) study a class of games
called Voronoi games where players choose a vertex v in a finite graph and the payoff of
each player is the Voronoi cell of v, that is, the set of vertices that is closer to v than to any
other chosen vertex. In our language this would correspond to a setting where both retailers
and consumers live only on the vertices of a network and all the edges have the same length.
For cyclic graphs Mavronicolas et al. (2008) find bounds for the price of anarchy. Their
result is similar to ours in the sense that the price of anarchy is not computed in terms of
retailers’ payoffs, but rather in terms of consumers’ costs. The big difference is that their
game is finite, since the action set for players in their game is the finite set of vertices. Our
model is the same as the one studied by Pa´lvo¨lgyi (2011). In his paper he finds conditions
for existence of pure equilibria for location games on a graph. We make use of several of his
intermediate results to prove our existence theorem and we fix a gap in his proof. The details
of the similarities and differences between our and his existence proof will be described in
Section 3.
In an interesting paper Heijnen and Soetevent (2014) consider a model where consumers
are uniformly distributed on a graph and two retailers choose prices but not location. They
overcome the difficulties of dealing with a network by focusing on prices and keeping locations
fixed, whereas we do the opposite: we assume that the price is exogenous and we focus on
location.
As mentioned before, we measure inefficiency of equilibria with the price of anarchy and
price of stability. These measures were introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999)
and Schulz and Stier-Moses (2003), respectively and given these names by Papadimitriou
(2001) and Anshelevich et al. (2008), respectively. The papers by Vetta (2002) and Mavron-
icolas et al. (2008) are two examples where the social cost used to compute the price of
anarchy is not the sum of the costs of the individual players. The same happens here, where
the game is a payoff game for the retailers and a cost game for the consumers.
Our efficiency results use majorization techniques (see, e.g., Marshall et al., 2011). Al-
though majorization is a very well-known tool in various areas of mathematics, probability,
statistics, and, more recently, economics, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been used
in game theory.
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1.4 Organization of the paper
In Section 2 the model is introduced. Section 3 proves existence of pure equilibria for
location games with a large number of players. Section 4 deals with efficiency of these
equilibria. Several examples are considered in Section 5.
2 The model
We start by providing a formal definition of network. Then we describe the normal form
location game played on this network.
2.1 The network
Consider a graph (V,E), where V is a finite set of vertices and E is a finite set of edges.
If the edge e joins the vertices u and v, we use the notation (u, v) := e. Based on (V,E),
we construct a set that we endow with a distance and a measure. First we associate to each
edge e a value λ(e) > 0, called the length of e. We want to treat each edge e like an interval
of length λ(e), so, for any edge e = (u, v) ∈ E we call
(u, v, α) = αu+ (1− α)v
the convex combination of u and v with weights α and (1−α). The point (u, v, 0) is identified
with the vertex v and the point (u, v, 1) is identified with the vertex u. Each point on an
edge is defined by two different triplets since (u, v, α) = (v, u, 1− α). If x1 = (u, v, α1) and
x2 = (u, v, α2), then we define the interval
[x1, x2] := {(u, v, η) : min(α1, α2) ≤ η ≤ max(α1, α2)}.
If e = (u, v), with an abuse of language we use the notation e also for the interval [u, v].
Consider the set
S := {(u, v, η) : u, v ∈ V, (u, v) ∈ E, η ∈ [0, 1]}. (2.1)
Now we endow S with a measure λ as it follows. First λ is defined on intervals: if x1 =
(u, v, α1) and x2 = (u, v, α2), then
λ([x1, x2]) = λ([u, v])× |α2 − α1|.
Then λ is additively extended to the σ-field generated by the intervals.
We are now ready to define a metric d on S that is coherent with λ. For any two points
x, y ∈ S, the distance d(x, y) is the measure λ of the shortest path that joins x and y. From
now on, for the sake of concision, we call S the metric measurable network (S, d, λ) and we
say that S is generated by (V,E, λ).
We call leaf a vertex v ∈ V such that degree(v) = 1. The network S generated by a graph
(V,E, λ) is equivalent to a network generated by a sub-graph whose vertices have degree
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different from 2. This subgraph can be obtained by performing this operation: whenever the
vertex u has degree two, delete it and replace [v, u] and [u, w] with [v, w] so that λ([v, w]) =
λ([v, u]) + λ([u, w]). Therefore we will always assume that V contains no vertices of degree
2. We then extend the definition of the function degree from V to S by assuming that
degree(x) = 2 for all x ∈ S \ V .
2.2 Retailers and consumers
We consider a situation where each of n retailers has to decide where to locate her shop
on a network, given that a continuum of consumers is uniformly distributed on the network
according to λ and each consumer patronizes a shop in the closest location.
Ties may arise and they are solved as follows. Consider the set A of consumers that are
equally distant from k different locations having each at least one shop. Then we assume
that for each of these k locations, λ(A)/k consumers go to that location. Moreover if one
of the k locations has h shops, then a fraction λ(A)/(hk) patronizes each shop of this loca-
tion. Basically the network is decomposed into domains of attraction of different retailers’s
locations and then within each domain of attraction retailers in the same location split the
consumers equally. Some parts of the network can belong to different domains of attraction,
as the following example shows.
Example 2.1. Consider the network in Figure 1 with seven players. Assume that λ(e4) =
λ(e5) and that two retailers are located in u and five retailers are located in v. All the points
in e8 are equally distant from u and v. Therefore the retailers in u jointly attract all the
consumers on the solid edges plus half of the consumers on e8. The retailers in v jointly
attract all the consumers on the dashed edges plus the remaining half of the consumers on
e8. That is, each player in u attracts the following quantity of consumers
1
2
(
λ(e1) + λ(e2) + λ(e3) + λ(e4) +
1
2
λ(e8)
)
and each player in v attracts the following quantity of consumers
1
5
(
λ(e5) + λ(e6) + λ(e7) +
1
2
λ(e8)
)
.
This example shows that the situation of a location game on a general network is more
complicated than the classical case of a game on a circle or a segment. The fact that a
set of positive measure may be equidistant from two points imposes some extra care in the
definition of the domain of attraction of retailers.
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e1
e3
e2
e6
e7
e4 e5
e8
2 players in u
5 players in vu v
Figure 1: Domains of attraction when λ(e4) = λ(e5).
2.3 The normal-form game
We model this situation as a normal form game with a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of players
having all the same action set S. Each player represents a retailer, whose payoff is the
measure of the set of consumers who shop at her store. In order to formally define the
players’ payoffs, we need to introduce the following quantities. Given a strategy profile
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S
n, call Ψ(x) the set of all locations that are occupied by some shop
under the strategy profile x, that is, the set of all y ∈ S for which there exists i ∈ N such
that y = xi. Given a set A, call card(A) its cardinality. It can happen that card(Ψ(x)) < n,
since several players can choose the same location. For K ⊂ Ψ(x) define
YK = {y ∈ S : d(y, xi) = d(y, xj) for all pairs xi, xj ∈ K
and d(y, xi) < d(y, xℓ) for all xi ∈ K, xℓ 6∈ K}.
(2.2)
The set YK is the subset of consumers who are indifferent between all retailers in K and
strictly prefer retailers in K to any other retailer outside K. Obviously for some choices of
K the set YK can be empty. The payoff of player i ∈ N under the strategy profile x is
ρi(x) =
1
card({j ∈ N : xj = xi})
∑
K⊂N
1xi∈K
λ(YK)
card(K)
. (2.3)
The above defined game is called location game on S with n players and is denoted by
L (n, S). A strategy profile x∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game L (n, S) if for all
i ∈ N and for all xi ∈ S we have
ρi(x
∗) ≥ ρi(x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
i−1, xi, x
∗
i+1, . . . , x
∗
n).
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For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of the paper we will use the term equilibrium to indicate
a pure equilibrium.
3 Existence of equilibria
In this section we deal with existence of equilibria in location games. It is well-known that
some location games do not admit equilibria (see, e.g., Proposition 5.3 below). Since the
players’ action spaces are infinite and their payoff functions are not continuous, no general
known result can be used to prove existence. Therefore, more specific arguments will have to
be employed, which rely on some structural properties of equilibria in location games. The
following theorem shows that a location game on any network S always admits a pure Nash
equilibrium, provided the number of players is large enough.
Theorem 3.1. For an arbitrary S, there exists n¯ ∈ N such that for every n ≥ n¯, the game
L (n, S) admits a pure Nash equilibrium.
We will show in the proof of Theorem 3.1 that we can take
n¯ = 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
5λ(e)
mine′∈E λ(e′)
⌉
, (3.1)
where ⌈x⌉ is the ceiling of x.
A similar result with a different bound was proposed in an unpublished paper by Pa´lvo¨lgyi
(2011), where he provides an algorithm as a constructive proof of the existence of equilibrium.
However, his algorithm provides a profile of location where the number of players on an edge
depends only on its length, hence, all the edges with the same length must have the same
number of players. As a consequence, his proof is incomplete: for instance, in a graph where
all the edges have the same length, his construction holds only for a number of players that
is proportional to the number of edges.
Given this issue, we provide a complete proof of Theorem 3.1. We use several steps of
Pa´lvo¨lgyi’s construction and fill the gap in his proof as detailed in Remark 3.15 below. Our
proof is constructive. First we show that to be an equilibrium of a location game a strategy
profile must satisfy several necessary conditions. These necessary conditions provide a solid
structure for equilibria in location games and are the building blocks in the construction of
our equilibrium for games with a large number of players.
3.1 Proofs
We first state some properties of equilibria that will be useful both to prove the existence
of equilibria and to compute their efficiency.
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Given a graph (V,E) without vertices of degree 2, define:
VI = {v ∈ V : degree(v) ≥ 3}, (3.2)
VL = {v ∈ V : degree(v) = 1}, (3.3)
EIL = {e ∈ E : e = (v, w), v ∈ VI , w ∈ VL}, (3.4)
ELL = {e ∈ E : e = (v, w), v, w ∈ VL}, (3.5)
EII = {e ∈ E : e = (v, w), v, w ∈ VI}. (3.6)
Our proof of the existence of equilibria in games with a large number of players provides
an equilibrium that satisfies the following key condition.
Definition 3.2. A strategy profile x satisfies the vertex property if, for all v ∈ VI , as defined
in (3.2), there exists i ∈ N such that xi = v.
Notice that, by Lemma 4.11 below, the vertex property is always satisfied by equilibria of
games with a large enough number of players.
Lemma 3.3. Consider an edge e that connects a leaf v and a vertex w. Let the equilibrium
x∗ of L (n, S) satisfy the vertex property. If, under this equilibrium, the closest player to the
leaf v is in the interior of e, then she cannot be alone.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that the closest player to the leaf v is in the interior of e
and is alone. Then she would profitably deviate by moving away from the leaf v, for as long
as she does not overcome the next player on e.
Lemma 3.4. Take any point w ∈ S. If the equilibrium x∗ of L (n, S) satisfies the vertex
property, then card{i ∈ N : x∗i = w} ≤ degree(w).
Lemma 3.4 implies that no more than two players can share the same location in the
interior of any edge. Only the vertices can have more than two players, but never more than
the degree of the vertex.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. We start with the case where w ∈ V . Consider an equilibrium x∗ of
L (n, S) that satisfies the vertex property. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists a
point w such that
card{i ∈ N : x∗i = w} =: k > degree(w).
Consider the set I (w) of all the edges that are incident on w. We can partition I (w) into a
set N (w) of edges that have a leaf and no player on them, except in w, and its complement
P(w). For e ∈ P(w) we call c(e) the location of the closest player to w on the edge e, who
exists, since every vertex that is not a leaf has at least one player. For e ∈ I (w) we define
δ(w, e) =

d(w, c(e))
2
if e ∈ P(w),
λ(e) if e ∈ N (w).
(3.7)
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Therefore δ(w, e) represents the mass of consumers on the edge e who shop at location w.
Given that card(I (w)) = degree(w), each player in w gains
1
k
∑
e∈I (w)
δ(w, e) ≤
card(I (w))
k
max
e∈I (w)
δ(w, e) < max
e∈I (w)
δ(w, e).
Then, for ε small enough, a player who moves by ε from w in the direction of argmaxe δ(w, e)
enjoys a profitable deviation.
If w 6∈ V , then we can make it a vertex by splitting the edge that contains w into two
edges incident on w. The previous argument goes through.
Definition 3.5. Consider a strategy profile x ∈ Sn and w ∈ S. If card{i ∈ N : xi = w} =
degree(w), then any player j such that xj = w is called x-balanced, and the location w is
said to be x-saturated.
Lemma 3.6. For n ≥ 2, if x∗ is an equilibrium of L (n, S) and player i is x∗-balanced, then
ρi(x
∗) ≤ ρj(x
∗) for all j ∈ N.
Proof. Let i be a x∗-balanced player. Then
ρi(x
∗) =
1
degree(x∗i )
∑
e∈I (x∗i )
δ(x∗i , e) ≤ max
e∈I (x∗i )
δ(x∗i , e),
where δ is defined in equation (3.7). Assume, ad absurdum, that there exists a player j such
that ρj(x
∗) < ρi(x
∗), then player j could deviate on the edge argmaxe δ(x
∗
i , e) at a distance
ε from x∗i and gain
max
e∈I (x∗i )
δ(x∗i , e)−
ε
2
> ρj(x
∗).
Corollary 3.7. In equilibrium all balanced players get the same payoff.
Proof. Just consider two balanced players and apply Lemma 3.6 to show that the payoff of
each one of them is smaller or equal than the payoff of the other.
Corollary 3.8. Consider an equilibrium x∗ of L (n, S) that satisfies the vertex property.
Then there exists ξ > 0 such that for every x∗-saturated location w and every e ∈ I (w), we
have δ(w, e) = ξ. Moreover every player on an x∗-saturated location has a payoff equal to ξ.
Proof. We start by showing that for each x∗-saturated location w we have
δ(w, e) = δ(w, e′) for all e, e′ ∈ I (w).
If this were not true, i.e., if we had
max
e∈I (w)
δ(w, e) >
1
card(I (w))
∑
e∈I (w)
δ(w, e),
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then one of the players in w could profitably deviate of ε on the edge argmaxe δ(w, e). So
each player in w has the same payoff that we denote ξw. Now, using Corollary 3.7, for every
pair v, w of x∗-saturated locations we have ξv = ξw =: ξ.
Definition 3.9. In an equilibrium x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) of the game L (n, S), player i ∈
{1, . . . , n} is a redundant player if the profile of location (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
i−1, x
∗
i+1, . . . , x
∗
n) is an
equilibrium of the game L (n− 1, S).
Our goal is to construct an equilibrium of the game L (n, S) for all n ≥ n¯, where n¯ is
defined as in (3.1). We pick an n ≥ n¯ and first we find an equilibrium for a game L (n′, S),
where n′ is slightly larger than n, in a way that the next proposition will make precise. Then
we prove that there exists enough redundant players to transform this equilibrium with n′
players into an equilibrium of a game with exactly n players.
Proposition 3.10. For a given S there exists n¯ ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n¯ there exists
n′ ∈ N for which
(a) n ≤ n′ ≤ n + card(E),
(b) the game L (n′, S) admits a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of this proposition requires the following lemma. Given S, define f : R+ → N
as follows:
f(z) = 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
λ(e)
2z
⌉
. (3.8)
The quantity f(ξ) represents the number of players on the network in our equilibrium, as
a function of the quantity ξ defined in Corollary 3.8.
Lemma 3.11. For all n ≥ 4 card(E), there exist ξ, ξ ∈ R+ such that
n ≤ f(z) ≤ n+ card(E), for all z ∈ [ξ, ξ).
Proof. The function f in (3.8) is defined as the sum of a constant and card(E) terms each
one of which is a piecewise constant, weakly decreasing, and right continuous function with
jumps of magnitude 1. Therefore, for all z0 > 0,
0 ≤ lim
z→z−0
f(z)− f(z0) ≤ card(E).
Moreover, we have
lim
z→∞
f(z) = 3 card(E) + card(E) = 4 card(E),
lim
z→0+
f(z) = +∞.
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Proof of Proposition 3.10. Let f be defined as in (3.8). Then
n¯ := f
(
mine∈E λ(e)
10
)
= 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
5λ(e)
mine′ λ(e′)
⌉
. (3.9)
Take n ≥ n¯. By Lemma 3.11 there exists an interval [ξ, ξ) such that, for ξ ∈ [ξ, ξ) we have
f(ξ) = n′, with n ≤ n′ ≤ n+ card(E).
We choose ξ = ξ and construct a Nash equilibrium x∗ of L (n′, S). This notation is
coherent with the previous definition of ξ because players in saturated locations get a payoff
equal to ξ. To achieve the equilibrium, we position players on the edges of S as follows.
First case: e ∈ EIL. If e = (v, w), with w ∈ VL, then, under x
∗, the number of players on
[v, w] is set to
p(e) := degree(v) +
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
+ 2.
Out of these players, degree(v) will be in v, and the remaining will be as in Figure 2.
Therefore the edge e is split into three intervals of length 2ξ, one interval of length ξ and
(p(e) − degree(v) − 5) intervals of length α(e)ξ, where α(e) is a parameter such that 1 ≤
α(e) ≤ 2. Taking into account the number of players on e, the length λ(e), and the number
of intervals of length α(e)ξ, we have
α(e) =
λ(e)− 7ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 3ξ
. (3.10)
1 player
2 players
degree(v) playersv w
2ξ 2ξ α(e)ξ . . . α(e)ξ 2ξ ξ
Figure 2: Players in e ∈ EIL.
Second case: e ∈ EII . If e = (v, w), with v, w ∈ VI , then, under x
∗, the number of players
on [v, w] is set to
degree(v) + degree(w) +
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
+ 1.
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Out of these players, degree(v) will be in v, degree(w) will be in w, and the remaining will
be as in Figure 3. This implies that
α(e) =
λ(e)− 6ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 2ξ
. (3.11)
Notice that in this case the construction is still valid if we reverse the roles of v and w.
1 player
2 players
degree(v) players
degree(w) playersv w
2ξ α(e)ξ · · · α(e)ξ α(e)ξ 2ξ 2ξ
Figure 3: Players in e ∈ EII .
Third case: e ∈ ELL. If e = (v, w), with v, w ∈ VL, then, under x
∗, the number of players
on [v, w] is set to ⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
+ 3.
They will be located as in Figure 4. This implies that
α(e) =
λ(e)− 8ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4ξ
. (3.12)
As before, in this case the construction remains valid if we reverse the roles of v and w.
1 player
2 playersv w
ξ 2ξ α(e)ξ · · · α(e)ξ 2ξ 2ξ ξ
Figure 4: Players in e ∈ ELL.
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The total number of players on S can be easily computed as follows. Given that each
vertex v ∈ V \ VL has degree(v) players, there is a total of 2 card(EII) + card(EIL) players
on the vertices. Moreover, for each e ∈ EII there are ⌈λ(e)/2ξ⌉ + 1 players in the interior
of e; for each e ∈ EIL there are ⌈λ(e)/2ξ⌉ + 2 players in the interior of e; for each e ∈ ELL
there are ⌈λ(e)/2ξ⌉+ 3 players in the interior of e. Hence the total number of players is
2 card(EII) + card(EIL) + card(EII) + 2 card(EIL) + 3 card(ELL) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
= 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
= f(ξ) = n′.
To prove that what we have constructed is a Nash equilibrium, we need to show that for
all e ∈ E, we have
1 ≤ α(e) ≤ 2. (3.13)
Under x∗, if inequality (3.13) is satisfied, the payoff of each player is between ξ and 2ξ.
Moreover, if a player deviated on an interval between two other players, then she would
obtain a payoff equal to half the length of that interval. If inequality (3.13) is satisfied, then
no interval between players is longer than 2ξ.
Furthermore, in this construction, all players who share a location with some other player
have a payoff equal to ξ. This implies that if a player deviates to a location that already
has more than one player, then her payoff becomes less than ξ. Therefore no player has a
profitable deviation.
Claim 3.12. For all e ∈ EIL, (3.13) holds.
Proof. Since ⌈x⌉ ≥ x, we have that 2 ⌈λ(e)/(2ξ)⌉ − 6 − λ(e)/ξ + 7 ≥ 0. Given (3.10), this
implies that α(e) ≤ 2. On the other hand α(e) ≥ 1 if and only if λ(e)/ξ−7−⌈λ(e)/(2ξ)⌉+3 ≥
0. To show that this inequality holds consider that
λ(e)
ξ
−
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4 ≥
λ(e)
ξ
−
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5 =
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5.
Since, by (3.9),
f(ξ) = n′ ≥ n¯ = f
(
mine′∈E λ(e
′)
10
)
and f is weakly decreasing, we have
ξ ≤
mine′∈E λ(e
′)
10
≤
λ(e)
10
and therefore
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5 ≥ 0.
Claim 3.13. For all e ∈ EII , (3.13) holds.
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Proof. Given (3.11), it is clear that α(e) ≤ 2. On the other hand α(e) ≥ 1 if and only if
λ(e)
ξ
− 6−
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
+ 2 ≥ 0.
The left hand side is larger than λ(e)/(2ξ) − 5. As mentioned in the proof of Claim 3.12,
expression (3.9) implies λ(e)/(2ξ)− 5 ≥ 0.
Claim 3.14. For all e ∈ ELL, (3.13) holds.
Proof. Given (3.12), it is clear that α(e) ≤ 2. On the other hand α(e) ≥ 1 if and only if
λ(e)
ξ
− 8−
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
+ 4 ≥ 0.
The left hand side is larger than λ(e)/(2ξ)−5, and again, (3.9) implies λ(e)/(2ξ)−5 ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Proposition 3.10 shows that for every
n ≥ 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
5λ(e)
mine′∈E λ(e′)
⌉
(3.14)
there exists an integer n ≤ n′ ≤ n + card(E) such that the game L (n′, S) admits a Nash
equilibrium. Given such an equilibrium, we now construct an equilibrium for a new game
with n′ − k players where 0 ≤ k ≤ card(E). This can be achieved by removing redundant
players (see Definition 3.9), as follows.
We start with the equilibrium of Proposition 3.10. For edges e = (v, w) ∈ EIL we can
remove one of the two players whose distance from v is 2ξ. For edges e = (v, w) ∈ EII we can
remove one of the two players whose distance from w is 2ξ. Finally for edges e = (v, w) ∈ ELL
we can remove one of the two players whose distance from w is 3ξ. This way we can remove
any number k of players with 0 ≤ k ≤ card(E). We now show that the removed players are
redundant.
In fact the above removal of players does not change the size of any interval between
players, but only the payoff of k players, who now gain 2ξ rather than ξ, therefore, it does
not produce any opportunity of profitable deviation for any other player, given that every
one of them gains at least ξ.
This proves that, for every n that satisfies inequality (3.14), the game L (n, S) admits an
equilibrium.
Remark 3.15. Our proof differs from the one in Pa´lvo¨lgyi (2011) in the following respects:
(a) The function f defined in (3.8) takes values in N ∩ [4 card(E),∞) and is decreasing,
but is not onto. As a consequence, there exist values n such that for no ξ we have
f(ξ) = n. The proof of Pa´lvo¨lgyi (2011) is based on a similar function, which, like
ours, is in general not onto, hence his result holds only in the special case where the
function f is indeed onto (for instance when the lengths of the edges are all different).
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(b) To achieve a general result, we introduce the notion of redundant players. This implies
that players’ arrangement on edges is different from the one found in Pa´lvo¨lgyi (2011),
in particular, some extra players are paired in some locations. This in turn changes
the distance between players on edges. One of these extra paired players is redundant
and can therefore be removed without affecting the equilibrium of the game with n−1
players. Our proof shows that this argument can be repeated card(E) times, which is
larger than the magnitude of the maximum jump of the function f . Hence, equilibria
exist for every n ≥ n¯.
(c) As a consequence of our construction, our threshold n¯ in (3.9) is different from the one
in Pa´lvo¨lgyi (2011).
4 Efficiency of equilibria
A location game L (n, S) is a constant-sum game. Therefore, since any strategy profile
produces the same total payoff for the retailers, it is efficient. Hence, to obtain a meaningful
result, we measure the efficiency of equilibria in terms of the consumers’ traveling cost and
not in terms of the players’ payoffs, as it is usually the case.
Consider a game L (n, S). For x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S
n and y ∈ S define
d(x, y) := min
i∈{1,...,n}
d(xi, y).
This is the distance between a consumer located in y and the closest retailer when the
strategy profile x is played. The social cost C(x) is defined as
C(x) :=
∫
S
d(x, y) dλ(y).
This is the total cost incurred by the consumers, when each one of them shops at the closest
store.
Definition 4.1. Consider a game L (n, S) that admits a Nash equilibrium. We denote En
the set of pure Nash equilibria of the game L (n, S) and define
1. the price of anarchy
PoA(n) :=
sup
x∈En C(x)
infx∈Sn C(x)
,
2. the price of stability
PoS(n) :=
infx∈En C(x)
infx∈Sn C(x)
.
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Since there always exists a positive mass of consumers at a strictly positive distance from
the closest possible retailer, we have that infx∈Sn C(x) > 0, therefore both PoA(n) and
PoS(n) are well defined.
The next theorem shows that asymptotically the price of anarchy cannot exceed 2. As
proved in the following sections, the result holds exactly and not only asymptotically for
simple configurations of the network, but not in general. The same theorem shows an
asymptotic result on the price of stability.
Theorem 4.2. Consider the sequence of games L (n, S). Then
(a) there exists a function Φ : N → R such that, whenever n is large enough for L (n, S)
to admit a Nash equilibrium, we have
PoA(n) ≤ Φ(n) and lim
n→∞
Φ(n) = 2.
(b)
lim
n→∞
PoS(n) = 1.
The interpretation of Theorem 4.2 is that, when the number of retailers is large, if they
are left to their own devices and play a bad Nash equilibrium, the outcome of their actions
could decrease efficiency by a factor of two, approximately. On the other hand, if a planner
cajoles them into playing a suitable Nash equilibrium, then efficiency is almost achieved.
Although PoS(n) ≤ 2, when S is the unit interval or the circle, for any n for which the
equilibrium exists, this property is not true in the general case: an example of a location
game on a star (see Remark 5.6) shows that the price of anarchy can be larger than 2, hence
the bound of Theorem 4.2(a) holds only asymptotically.
Remark 4.3. Note that in our model neither entry costs nor production costs are present.
To accommodate entry costs, we should consider a different model with an outside option,
that is, the players’ action space should be S ∪ {OUT}, where OUT means that a player
does not enter the market. Since the total mass of consumers is fixed, a large number of
players would imply a payoff smaller than the entry cost for some of them, and therefore
these players would choose the action OUT. As far as production cost are concerned, since
the price p is exogenous, our model implicitly assumes that the fixed production cost is zero
and the marginal production cost is smaller than p, so that the payoff of each retailer is
increasing in her market share.
Remark 4.4. Vetta (2002) studies a class of games, called valid utility games, where players
choose facility locations and he proves that the price of anarchy for this class of games is
bounded above by 2. Remark 5.6 below shows that, despite some similarities, locations
games, as studied in our paper, are not valid utility games.
Roughgarden (2015) introduces the class of (λ, µ)-smooth games and uses it to prove
bounds for the price of anarchy of games in this class. For instance valid utility games are
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(1, 1)-smooth and Vetta’s bound on the price of anarchy can be easily proved with smoothness
tools. Unfortunately smoothness techniques do not seem to be useful for location games.
The reason being that these games are payoff-maximization games with a finite number of
players, but the objective function that is used to compute the price of anarchy is a cost
function, and it measures the cost incurred by the continuum of consumers. In particular it
is not possible to find any useful inequality between the retailers’ payoff and the consumers’
cost. Moreover, a full theory of the use of smoothness to bound the price of stability has not
been developed, yet.
4.1 Proofs
We introduce some concepts in the theory of majorization that will be used to prove some
results about efficiency of equilibria. We refer the reader to Marshall et al. (2011) for an
extensive analysis of this topic.
Definition 4.5. Given a vector z = (z1, . . . , zn), call z[1] ≥ · · · ≥ z[n] its decreasing rear-
rangement. Let x,y ∈ Rn+ be such that
n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
i=1
yi
and, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
k∑
i=1
x[i] ≤
k∑
i=1
y[i].
Then we say that x is majorized by y (x ≺ y).
Definition 4.6. A function φ : Rn+ → R is said to be Schur-convex if x ≺ y implies
φ(x) ≤ φ(y).
Lemma 4.7. If ψ : R+ → R is a convex function and
φ(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
ψ(xi),
then φ is Schur-convex.
Definition 4.8. Let x satisfy the vertex property as in Definition 3.2. Then, for a, b ∈ S,
we call [a, b] an x-half interval if either
(i) there exist e ∈ E and i ∈ N such that b ∈ e is a leaf, xi = a ∈ e, and for no j ∈ N we
have xj ∈ (a, b], or
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(ii) there exist e ∈ E and i, ℓ ∈ N such that xi = a ∈ e, xℓ ∈ e, for no j ∈ N we have xj
between a and xℓ, and d(a, b) = d(b, xℓ) = d(a, xℓ)/2, i.e., b is the middle point between
a and xℓ.
In both cases the roles of a and b can be interchanged.
Basically, when a profile satisfies the vertex property, a half interval indicates the share
of consumers that retailers in a location xi attract along one direction emanating from xi.
This could be either the whole interval from xi to a leaf (condition (i)) or the interval from
xi to the midpoint between xi and xℓ (condition (ii)).
In profile x, ifm players share the same location, then we use the convention that there are
2(m− 1) zero-length x-half intervals between them. If profile x satisfies the vertex property
then the whole graph can be covered with x-half intervals. We call H(x) the class of all
x-half intervals in S. We denote Λ := λ(S).
Lemma 4.9. Given a strategy profile x, there exists i ∈ N such that ρi(x) ≤ Λ/n.
Proof. If ρi(x) > Λ/n for all i ∈ N , then
∑n
i=1 ρi(x) > Λ, which is a contradiction, since∑n
i=1 ρi(x) = Λ.
Lemma 4.10. If x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of L (n, S), then for all y ∈ S we have d(x∗, y) ≤
2Λ/n.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction that there exists y0 ∈ S is such that d(x
∗, y0) > 2Λ/n. By
Lemma 4.9 there exists a player whose payoff is less than or equal to Λ/n. This player could
deviate to y0 and then attract at least half the consumers between y0 and the closest player,
namely she could get a payoff larger than Λ/n, making the deviation profitable.
Lemma 4.11. Let n > n¯, with n¯ defined as in (3.1). Assume that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium
of L (n, S). Then x∗ satisfies the vertex property.
Proof. We have
n¯ = 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
5λ(e)
mine′∈E λ(e′)
⌉
≥ 3 card(E) +
5Λ
mine′∈E λ(e′)
>
4Λ
mine′∈E λ(e′)
If n > n¯, then for any edge e ∈ E we have λ(e) ≥ 4Λ/n and, therefore, by Lemma 4.9, there
are at least two players on e.
Take v0 ∈ VI and assume, ad absurdum, that no player is in v0. Let i be the player whose
location x∗i is the closest to v0 (i is not necessarily unique). If player imoves towards v0 by ε <
d(x∗i , v0), then she loses ε/2 on the edge where she resides, but she gains (degree(v0)− 1)ε/2
on the other incident edges on v0. Therefore moving towards v0 is a profitable deviation,
which contradicts the assumption that x∗ is an equilibrium.
Lemma 4.12. Let x satisfy the vertex property. Then the number of x-half intervals in S
is 2n+ 2 card(E)− card(VI)− card(V ).
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Proof. Placing one player on each v ∈ VI creates card(E) intervals between two vertices.
Every time a new player is placed on some edge, a new interval is created (by splitting an
existing interval into two). This is true also if the new player is placed in the same location
of an existing player, since this creates two zero-length half intervals. Therefore, once all n
players are placed on S, there are exactly card(E) + n − card(VI) intervals. Each on them
contains two x-half intervals, except the ones between a player and a leaf, which contain
one half interval. Therefore the number of x-half intervals is 2 card(E) + 2n − card(VI) −
card(V ).
Lemma 4.13. Assume that x∗ is an equilibrium of L (n, S) and [a, b] is an x∗-half interval.
Then λ([a, b]) ≤ Λ/n.
Proof. Assume, ad absurdum, that λ([a, b]) > Λ/n. By Lemma 4.9, there exists i ∈ N such
that ρi(x
∗) ≤ Λ/n. Two cases are possible.
Case (i) of Definition 4.8. If player i deviates to [a, b] at a distance ε from a, then, for ε
small enough, her payoff becomes λ([a, b])− ε > Λ/n.
Case (ii) of Definition 4.8. If player i deviates to b, then her payoff becomes λ([a, b]) > Λ/n.
The existence of profitable deviations contradicts the assumption that x∗ is a Nash equi-
librium.
Lemma 4.14. Assume that the conditions of Lemma 4.11 are satisfied. Then C(x∗) ≤
Λ2/2n.
Proof. By Lemma 4.11, x∗ satisfies the vertex property. From the definition of social cost
C it follows that
C(x∗) =
∑
[a,b]∈H(x∗)
λ([a, b])2
2
.
Call λ(x∗) the vector of all λ([a, b]) such that [a, b] ∈ H(x∗). By Lemma 4.13, λ(x∗)
is dominated in the majorization order by the vector (Λ/n, . . . ,Λ/n, 0, . . . , 0), where the
number of positive components is n. Since the function (z1, . . . , zm) 7→
∑m
i=1 z
2
1/2 is Schur-
convex, we have
C(x∗) ≤
n∑
i=1
1
2
(
Λ
n
)2
=
Λ2
2n
.
Lemma 4.15. The following inequality holds:
inf
x∈Sn
C(x) ≥
Λ2
2(2n+ 2 card(EII) + card(EIL))
.
Proof. Call N˜ = N ∪ VI a fictitious set of players obtained by adding to the original set of
players N one player for each vertex of degree larger than 2 and define n˜ = card(N˜). It is
clear that
inf
x∈Sn
C(x) ≥ C(x˜),
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where the profile x˜ contains n˜ players: n players are located according to social optimum,
and n˜−n players located on each vertex of degree larger than 3, unoccupied in the optimum.
Applying the argument used in Lemma 4.12 to this new profile, we can show that the
number of x˜-half intervals is
M :=2n+ 2 card(E)− card(V ) + card(VI)
=2n+ 2 card(E)− card(VL)
=2n+ 2 card(E)− card(EIL)− 2 card(ELL)
=2n+ 2 card(EII) + card(EIL).
It is clear that λ(x˜) dominates the vector (Λ/M, . . . ,Λ/M). Since
M∑
i=1
1
2
(
Λ
M
)2
=
Λ2
2M
,
we have
inf
x∈Sn
C(x) ≥ C(x˜) ≥
Λ2
2M
.
Proof of Theorem 4.2(a). From the bounds in Lemmata 4.14 and 4.15 we conclude that
PoA(n) ≤ Φ(n) :=
4n+ 4 card(EII) + 2 card(EIL)
2n
−−−→
n→∞
2.
Claim 4.16. Consider the equilibrium x∗ constructed in the proof of Proposition 3.10. Then
C(x∗) =
∑
e∈EIL
(
7
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 3
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
)
+
∑
e∈EII
(
6
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 2
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
)
+
∑
e∈ELL
(
8
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
)
.
Proof. Each edge e ∈ EIL contains 7 half intervals of length ξ and ⌈λ(e)(2ξ)⌉ − 3 intervals
of length α(e)ξ. The cost of edge e is then
7
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 3
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
.
Each edge e ∈ EII contains 6 half intervals of length ξ and ⌈λ(e)/(2ξ)⌉ − 2 intervals of
length α(e)ξ. The cost of edge e is then
6
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 2
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
.
Each edge e ∈ ELL contains 8 half intervals of length ξ and ⌈λ(e)/(2ξ)⌉ − 4 intervals of
length α(e)ξ. The cost of edge e is then
8
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
.
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Claim 4.17.
Λ
2n− 4 card(E)
≤ ξ ≤
Λ
2n− 6 card(E)
.
Proof. By definition, ξ is such that f(ξ) = n′ with n ≤ n′ ≤ n+ card(E), where f is defined
as in (3.8). Therefore
n ≤ 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
≤ n + card(E),
which implies
Λ
2n− 4 card(E)
≤ ξ ≤
Λ
2n− 6 card(E)
.
Given two functions g and h, we say that g(n) ∼
n→∞
h(n) if g(n)/h(n) → 1 as n goes to
infinity.
Claim 4.18. For all e ∈ E we have limn→∞ α(e) = 2.
Proof. Claim 4.17 implies
ξ ∼
n→∞
Λ
2n
. (4.1)
Therefore, if e ∈ EIL, then
α(e) =
λ(e)− 7ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 3ξ
∼
n→∞
2;
if e ∈ EII , then
α(e) =
λ(e)− 6ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 2ξ
∼
n→∞
2;
if e ∈ ELL, then
α(e) =
λ(e)− 8ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4ξ
∼
n→∞
2.
Claim 4.19.
C(x∗) ∼
n→∞
Λ2
4n
.
Proof. Using Claims 4.16 and 4.18, we have
C(x∗) ∼
ξ→0
∑
e∈EIL
(
ξ2
2
+
λ(e)ξ
2
)
+
∑
e∈EII
(
ξ2 +
λ(e)ξ
2
)
+
∑
e∈ELL
(
2ξ2 +
λ(e)ξ
2
)
.
Hence
C(x∗) ∼
ξ→0
∑
e∈E
λ(e)ξ
2
,
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that is, thanks to (4.1),
C(x∗) ∼
n→∞
Λ2
4n
.
Proof of Theorem 4.2(b). By Lemma 4.15 we have
inf
x∈Sn
C(x) ≥
Λ2
4n+ 4 card(EII) + 2 card(EIL)
.
Therefore
PoS(n) ≤ C(x∗)
(
Λ2
4n+ 4 card(EII) + 2 card(EIL)
)−1
.
Since
Λ2
4n+ 4 card(EII) + 2 card(EIL))
∼
n→∞
Λ2
4n
and PoS(n) ≥ 1, using Claim 4.19, we obtain
lim
n→∞
PoS(n) = 1.
5 Examples
In this section we consider some simple examples of networks and show that in some cases
exact results can be obtained.
5.1 The circle
We now assume consumers to be distributed on the unit circle C . This model has been
studied by Eaton and Lipsey (1975), who deal with existence of equilibria for the model
without price, and by Salop (1979), who considers the model with price. Notice that stricto
sensu this is not a particular case of our general model, since the circle is not a graph. We
can see it as a graph where all points have degree 2.
Proposition 5.1. For every n ≥ 1 the set of equilibria of the game L (n,C ) is non-empty.
Proposition 5.2. In the game L (n,C ), we have:
(a)
PoA(n) =
{
2 if n is even,
2
n
n+ 1
if n is odd.
(b)
PoS(n) = 1.
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1 player
2 players
Figure 5: Left: best equilibrium x˜ with 6 players; middle: worst equilibrium x̂ with 6
players; right: worst equilibrium x˘ with 5 players, on C .
5.2 The segment
The model described in this subsection was studied in details by Eaton and Lipsey (1975)
under slightly different assumptions. We consider the location game on a segment, which,
without loss of generality, is assumed to be [0, 1].
Proposition 5.3. Consider the location game L (n, [0, 1]).
(a) For n = 2, 4, 5 there exists a unique (modulo permutation of players) pure Nash equi-
librium
(b) For n = 3, there is no pure Nash equilibrium.
(c) For n ≥ 6, there is an infinite number of pure Nash equilibria.
If, without any loss of generality, we assume that the equilibrium x∗ satisfies x∗i ≤ x
∗
i+1
and we call ηi = x
∗
i+4 − x
∗
i+3, then Figure 6 is an example of n-player Nash equilibrium if
and only if
(i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 5}, we have ηi ≥ ξ,
(ii) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 6}, we have (ηi + ηi+1)/2 ≤ ξ.
1 player
2 players0 1
ξ 2ξ η1 η2 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ηn−6 ηn−5 2ξ ξ
Figure 6: Equilibrium with n players.
Proposition 5.4. In the game L (n, [0, 1]), we have:
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(a)
PoA(n) =
{
2 if n is even,
2
n
n+ 1
if n > 3 is odd.
(b) For n = 2
PoS(n) = 2.
For n ≥ 4
PoS(n) =
n
n− 2
.
0 1
1
2n
1
n
1
n · · ·
1
n
1
n
1
2n
0 1
1
2n−4
1
n−2
1
n−2 · · ·
1
n−2
1
n−2
1
2n−4
0 1
1
n
2
n · · · · · ·
2
n
1
n
0 1
1
n+1
2
n+1 · · · · · ·
2
n+1
1
n+1
1 player 2 players
Figure 7: Top left: Social optimum x with n players. Top right: Best equilibrium x˜ with n
players. Bottom left: Worst equilibrium x̂ with n players (n even). Bottom right: Example
of worst equilibrium x̂ℓ with n players (n odd), where ℓ is the only unmatched player.
5.3 The star
In the whole section, we have k > 2. We assume S to be a star Sk, that is a network with
k+1 vertices {v0, v1, . . . , vk} where for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} vertex vj is connected to vertex v0 and
to no other vertex. The length of all the edges [v0, vj ] is assumed to be equal to 1.
Proposition 5.5. Consider a location game L (n, Sk).
(a) If 2 ≤ n ≤ k, then a unique equilibrium x∗ exists where x∗i = v0 for all i ∈ N .
(b) If k < n < 3k − 1, then there is no Nash equilibrium.
(c) If 3k − 1 ≤ n ≤ 3k, then there exists a unique equilibrium.
(d) If 3k + 1 ≤ n, then there exists an infinite number of equilibria.
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Figure 8 shows some examples of equilibria on the star with different numbers of players.
1 player 2 players k − 1 players r players
ξ2ξ ξ2ξ2ξ ξ2ξ2ξy
Figure 8: Equilibria on Sk with 3k − 1 players, 4k − 1 players and 4k + r players (with
k/(2r+2+5k) ≤ ξ ≤ k/(2r+5k)). In all the pictures k = 6 and in the right one y = 1−5ξ.
On each star the disposition of players is the same on all the k rays.
Remark 5.6. For both the segment and the circle the price of anarchy has a nonmonotonic
behavior in the number of players, but is always smaller than or equal 2. The next example
shows that this is not the case for the star, where the price of anarchy takes values that are
larger than 2 infinitely often. For the sake of simplicity, we consider the case k = 3.
Consider the sequence of games L (n, S3) where S3 is a star with 3 rays and the number
of players is n = 3(2b+ 1), with b > 2.
The worst equilibrium x̂ is as follows: there are b pairs of players on each ray, and 3
players in the center. Its social cost is
C(x̂) = 3(2b+ 1)
1
2(2b+ 1)2
=
3
4b+ 2
.
Consider now the profile x such that one player is located at at the center and 2b+1 players
sit on each ray, except one ray that has 2b players. Its costs is
C(x) = 2(4b+ 3)
1
2(4b+ 3)2
+ (4b+ 1)
1
2(4b+ 1)2
=
1
4b+ 3
+
1
8b+ 2
.
Figure 9 shows profiles x̂ and x for the case b = 1.
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2/3
2/3
2/3
1/3
1/3
1/3
2/72/7
2/5
2/7
2/7
2/5
2/7
2/7
1/7
1/7
1/5
1 player
2 players
3 players
Figure 9: Left: equilibrium x̂ on S3 with 9 players. Right: good configuration x on S3 with
9 players.
Since the cost of the optimal profile is not greater than C(x), we have
PoA(n) ≥
C(x̂)
C(x)
=
3
(4b+ 2)( 1
4b+3
+ 1
8b+2
)
=
3
4b+2
4b+3
+ 4b+2
8b+2
> 2
for all b > 2. The last inequality follows from the fact that the denominator is equal to
3
2
−
1
4b+ 3
+
1
8b+ 2
<
3
2
.
Obviously PoA(n)→ 2, as b→∞.
On the other hand in location games on the star the price of anarchy takes values smaller
than 2 for infinitely many values of n. Consider the class of games L (n, S3) with n = 6b+1,
b > 2. Figure 10 shows the case b = 3.
The worst equilibrium x̂ is as follow: there are 2 players in the center, b pairs of players
equally spaced on 2 rays, and (b − 1) pairs plus a single player equally spaced on the third
ray. We have
C(x̂) = 3(2b+ 1)
1
2(2b+ 1)2
=
3
2(2b+ 1)
.
The optimum profile x is as follow: there is 1 player at the center and 2b players equally
spaced on each of the 3 ray. We have
C(x) = 3(4b+ 1)
1
2(4b+ 1)2
=
3
2(4b+ 1)
.
Therefore,
PoA(n) =
4b+ 1
2b+ 1
< 2.
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1 player
2 players
Figure 10: An example of worst equilibrium (left) and social optimum (right) on S3 with
19 players.
5.4 Proofs
The circle
The set action for the players is now a circle C with radius r. Without loss of generality
we can suppose that r = 1. We fix an arbitrary origin 0 and identify the circle C with R/2π
and we consider the representations in [0, 2π). We now define 3 different profiles of locations
in the game L (n,C ).
(i) Call x˜ the profile such that
x˜i =
i
n
2π.
(ii) For n even call x̂ the action profile such that
x̂2i−1 = x̂2i =
2i
n
2π, i ∈ {1, . . . , n/2}.
(iii) For n odd call x˘ the action profile such that
x˘2i−1 = x˘2i =
2i
n
2π, i ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊n/2⌋}
x˘n = 2π.
Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 are direct consequences of the following lemma. Considerations
about the existence of equilibria for location games on the circle were already present in
Eaton and Lipsey (1975).
Lemma 5.7. (a) The action profiles x˜, x̂, and x˘ are equilibria in L (n,C ).
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(b) For all positive n,
x˜ ∈ arg min
x∈En
C(x), (5.1)
x˜ ∈ arg min
x∈C n
C(x), (5.2)
and
C(x˜) =
π2
n
. (5.3)
(c) For n even
x̂ ∈ argmax
x∈En
C(x) (5.4)
and
C(x̂) =
2π2
n
. (5.5)
(d) For n odd
x˘ ∈ argmax
x∈En
C(x) (5.6)
and
C(x˘) =
2π2
n+ 1
. (5.7)
We define the simplex
Sn(a) :=
{
(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ R
n
+ :
n∑
i=1
yi = a
}
. (5.8)
Proof of Lemma 5.7. (a)(i) In the profile x˜ every player’s payoff is 2π/n. The length of any
interval between two consecutive players is 2π/n so a unilateral deviation to such an interval
is not profitable. A unilateral deviation to a location already occupied by another player
would produce a payoff equal to either 3π/(2n) or π/n, depending on whether this player
is or is not a neighbor. In both cases such a deviation is not profitable, hence, x˜ is a Nash
equilibrium.
(ii) In the profile x̂ every player’s payoff is 2π/n. The length of an interval between two
consecutive chosen locations is 4π/n, so a unilateral deviation in such an interval is not
strictly profitable. A unilateral deviation to a location already chosen by another pair of
players would produce a payoff equall to 4π/(3n), and would not be profitable. Hence, x̂ is
a Nash equilibrium.
(iii) In the profile x˘, every player’s payoff is larger than 2π/(n + 1). The length of an
interval between two consecutive chosen locations is 4π/(n + 1) so a unilateral deviation in
such an interval is not strictly profitable. A unilateral deviation to a location already chosen
by a single player would produce a payoff of 2π/(n+ 1), and is not profitable. A unilateral
deviation to a position already chosen by a pair of players would produce a payoff equal to
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either 2π/(n + 1) or 4π/(3n + 3) depending on whether the deviator is or is not the single
player that deviates to one of her neighbor’s location. In both cases the deviation would not
be profitable and we can conclude that x̂ is a Nash equilibrium.
(b) We remind the reader that λ(x) is the vector of all λ([a, b]) such that [a, b] ∈ H(x),
where H(x) is the class of all x-half intervals in S. With these notations, we have that
λ(x˜) = (π/n, . . . , π/n) ∈ S2n(2π). This vector is majorized by any vector in S2n(2π). Since
the mapping z 7→ z2/2 is convex, we can apply Lemma 4.7 and conclude by Schur convexity
that x˜ ∈ argminx∈C n C(x). Moreover, x˜ is an equilibrium, hence, x˜ ∈ argminx∈En C(x).
The cost C(x˜) can be written as
C(x˜) =
∑
[a,b]∈H(x˜)
λ([a, b])2
2
=
2n∑
i=1
π2
2n2
=
π2
n
.
(c) The vector λ(x̂) = (2π/n, . . . , 2π/n, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ S2n(2π), is such that its n first compo-
nents are 2π/n and the remaining n are 0. It follows from Lemma 4.13 that at equilibrium,
no half intervals can have a length longer than 2π/n. Any vector in S2n(2π) whose com-
ponents are bounded by 2π/n is majorized by λ(x̂). We conclude by Schur convexity that
x̂ ∈ argmaxx∈En C(x). Moreover,
C(x̂) =
∑
[a,b]∈H(x̂)
λ([a, b])2
2
=
n∑
i=1
4π2
2n2
=
2π2
n
.
(d) The vector λ(x˘) = (2π/(n + 1), . . . , 2π/(n + 1), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ S2n(2π), has the first n + 1
components equal to 2π/(n + 1) and the remaining n − 1 equal to 0. Since n is odd, in
equilibrium there are at most (n − 1)/2 pairs of players who share the same location, and
therefore at most n − 1 half intervals with length 0. Therefore, for any equilibrium x∗,
the vector λ(x∗) is majorized by λ(x˘) and we can conclude that x˘ ∈ argmaxx∈En C(x).
Moreover
C(x˘) =
∑
[a,b]∈H(x˘)
λ([a, b])2
2
=
n+1∑
i=1
4π2
2(n+ 1)2
=
2π2
n + 1
.
The segment
We refer to Eaton and Lipsey (1975) or Pa´lvo¨lgyi (2011) for a proof of Proposition 5.3.
Proposition 5.4 is a direct consequence of Lemmata 5.8 and 5.9 below.
Lemma 5.8. If for all i ∈ N we define
xi =
2i− 1
2n
,
then
x ∈ arg min
x∈[0,1]n
C(x) (5.9)
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and
C(x) =
1
4n
. (5.10)
Proof. λ(x) = (1/(2n), . . . , 1/(2n)) ∈ S2n(1) is majorized by any vector in S2n(1). Hence
x minimizes C(·) and
C(x) =
∑
[a,b]∈H(x¯)
λ([a, b])2
2
=
2n∑
i=1
1
8n2
=
1
4n
.
Lemma 5.9. Consider the game L (n, [0, 1]) and the action profiles x˜, x̂, and x̂ℓ, for ℓ ∈
{2, . . . , (n− 3)/2}, defined as follows:
For n ≥ 5
x˜1 = x˜2 =
1
2n− 4
,
x˜i =
2i− 3
2n− 4
, i ∈ {3, . . . , n− 2},
x˜n−1 = x˜n =
2n− 5
2n− 4
.
For n even
x̂2i−1 = x̂2i =
2i− 1
n
, i ∈ {1, . . . , n/2}.
For n odd and ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , (n− 3)/2}
x̂ℓ2i−1 = x̂
ℓ
2i =
2i− 1
n+ 1
, i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},
x̂ℓ2ℓ+1 =
2ℓ+ 1
n+ 1
,
x̂ℓ2i = x̂
ℓ
2i+1 =
2i+ 1
n+ 1
, i ∈
{
ℓ+ 1, . . . ,
n− 1
2
}
.
(a) The action profiles x˜, x̂, and x̂ℓ are equilibria in L (n, [0, 1]).
(b) For all n ≥ 4
x˜ = argmin
x∈En
C(x) (5.11)
and
C(x˜) =
1
4(n− 2)
. (5.12)
(c) For n even
x̂ = argmax
x∈En
C(x) (5.13)
and
C(x̂) =
1
2n
. (5.14)
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(d) For n > 3 odd
x̂
ℓ = argmax
x∈En
C(x) (5.15)
and
C(x̂ℓ) =
n
2(n+ 1)
. (5.16)
Proof. (a) In the profile x˜ every player’s payoff is 1/(n− 2) and there is no interval between
two players (or between a player and a leaf) with length larger than 1/(n−2), so no profitable
deviation in the interior of an interval is possible. A deviation to a location with a single
player (resp. a pair of players) would induce a payoff of at most 3/(4n−8) (resp. 1/(2n−4))
and is therefore not profitable.
In the profile x̂ every player’s payoff is 1/n. A deviation in an interval between two
consecutive players (or between a player and a leaf) would induce a payoff equal to 1/n
or less, and a deviation to an occupied location would induce a payoff of 2/(3n). Both
deviations are unprofitable.
In the profile x̂ℓ every player has a payoff equal to either 1/(n + 1) or 2/(n + 1). A
deviation to an interval between two players (or between a player and a leaf) would induce a
payoff smaller than 1/(n+1). A deviation to the location occupied by a single player would
induce a payoff of 1/(n+1) and a deviation to a location occupied by a pair of players would
induce a payoff of 1/(n + 1) or 2/(3n + 3), irrespective of whether the deviator is or is not
the single player deviating to one of its neighbor location. In both cases, the deviation is
not profitable.
(b) In this case
λ(x˜) =
(
1
2n− 4
, . . . ,
1
2n− 4
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
∈ S2n(1),
i.e., the 2n − 4 first components are equal and positive and the last 4 are 0. Since at
equilibrium we necessarily have x1 = x2 and xn−1 = xn, for any equilibrium x
∗, the vector
λ(x∗) must contain 4 null components. The vector λ(x˜) is majorized by any vector in S2n(1)
with 4 null components, therefore, x˜ ∈ argminx∈En C(x). Moreover,
min
x∈En
C(x) =
∑
[a,b]∈H(x˜)
λ([a, b])2
2
=
2n−4∑
i=1
1
2(2n− 4)2
=
1
4(n− 2)
.
(c) In this case
λ(x̂) =
(
1
n
, . . . ,
1
n
, 0, . . . , 0
)
∈ S2n(1),
i.e., the first n components are equal to 1/n and the last n are 0. According to Lemma 4.13,
in equilibrium the length of any half interval is at most 1/n. Any vector in S2n(1) with
components smaller than 1/n is majorized by λ(x̂), hence, x̂ ∈ argmaxx∈En C(x). Moreover,
max
x∈En
C(x) =
∑
[a,b]∈H(x̂)
λ([a, b])2
2
=
n∑
i=1
1
2(n)2
=
1
2n
.
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(d) The argument is similar to the one used to prove (c).
The optimum and equilibrium profiles used in Lemmata 5.8 and 5.9 are depicted in Fig-
ure 7.
The star
For j ∈ {1, . . . , k} define N j =
{
i ∈ N : xi ∈ ev0vj \ {v0}
}
and call h(j) the cardinality
of N j . Order the players ij,1 ≺ · · · ≺ ij,h(j) ∈ N
j in terms of the distance of their actions
xij,1 , . . . , xij,h(j) from v0, from the smallest to the largest (solve the ties arbitrarily).
For j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, define
pj(x) =
{
d(v0, xij,1)/2 if there is at least one player on ev0vj ,
1 otherwise.
To simplify the notation we call
gij,ℓ = ρij,ℓ(x
∗).
Therefore, if the profile x is such that there is a player in v0, then
(a) the payoff of the player in v0 is ∑k
j=1 pj(x)
card{ℓ : xℓ = v0}
,
(b) for j in {1, . . . , k} we have
gij,1 =
d(v0, xij,1) + d(xij,1 , xij,2)
2 card{m : xm = xij,1}
,
gij,ℓ =
d(xij,ℓ−1 , xij,ℓ) + d(xij,ℓ , xij,ℓ+1)
2 card{m : xm = xij,ℓ}
for ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , h(j)− 1},
gij,h(j) =
2d(xij,h(j) , vj) + d(xij,h(j) , xij,h(j)−1)
2 card{m : xm = xij,h(j)}
.
Let j¯ = argminj pj and assume that in the profile x there is no player in v0. Then,
considering that the closest player to the vertex attracts also some consumers on other
edges, we have that for j in {1, . . . , k}
gij,1 =

d(xij,1, xij ,2) + d(xij,1 , xij¯,1)
2 card{m : xm = xij,1}
for j 6= j¯,
2pj¯ +
∑
j 6=j¯(pj − pj¯) + d(xij¯,1 , xij¯,2)
2 card{m : xm = xij¯,1}
for j = j¯.
with xij,2 = vj if xij,1 is the only location on the edge j.
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Lemma 5.10. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of the location game L (n, Sk). Then the
following hold:
(a) There exists i∗ ∈ {1, ..., N} such that x∗i∗ = v0.
(b) For every x ∈ S \ {v0}, card{i : x
∗
i = x} ≤ 2.
(c) card{i : x∗i = v0} ≤ k.
(d) If for some i ∈ N we have x∗i ∈ S \ {v0}, then for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k} there exist at
least two players ij,h(j), ij,h(j)−1 ∈ N
j such that x∗ij,h(j) = x
∗
ij,h(j)−1
.
Proof. (a) Consider a star Sk with k ≥ 3 and assume ad absurdum that no player is in v0.
Consider the player i such that x∗i is the closest position to v0. For ε < d(x
∗
i , v0), if player i
moves of ε towards the center, then she loses ε/2 on the edge where she is and gains ε/2 on
every other edge. Therefore moving towards the center is profitable.
(b) and (c) These are particular cases of Lemma 3.4.
(d) Suppose that there exists i ∈ N such that x∗i ∈ S \ {v0}. Then player i cannot be alone
on her edge: if she were, she would have a profitable deviation by moving towards the center.
If one edge were empty, then any of the players could profitably deviate by moving to the
empty edge, close enough to v0.
Lemma 5.11. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of L (n, Sk) and let y ∈ ev0,vj \ {v0}, be such
that
card{ℓ : x∗ℓ = y} = 2,
and call iℓ and iℓ+1 the two players in y. We have
(a) if h(j) > ℓ+ 1, then
gij,ℓ = gij,ℓ+1 = d(x
∗
ij,ℓ
, x∗ij,ℓ−1) = d(x
∗
ij,ℓ+1
, x∗ij,ℓ+2) =: ξ(y).
(b) if h(j) = ℓ+ 1, then
gij,ℓ = gij,ℓ+1 = d(x
∗
ij,ℓ
, x∗ij,ℓ−1) =
1
2
d(x∗ij,ℓ+1 , vj) =: ξ(y).
(c) The value ξ(y) does not depend on y (hence we simply denote it ξ).
Proof. This follows directly from Corollary 3.8.
Lemma 5.12. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of L (n, Sk). If card{ℓ : x
∗
ℓ = v0} = degree(v0) =
k, then
pj(x
∗) = ξ.
Proof. This also follows from Corollary 3.8.
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Proof of Proposition 5.5. (a) First we prove that the profile x∗ such that x∗i = v0 for all
i ∈ N is indeed an equilibrium. If any player i deviates, then she will obtain a payoff that
is strictly less than 1, whereas by not deviating she obtains k/n ≥ 1.
Now we turn to prove uniqueness. Assume by contradiction that there exists an equilib-
rium such that for some i ∈ N we have xi ∈ ev0vj . Then, by Lemma 5.10(d), each edge ev0vj
has been chosen by at least two players. This implies that n ≥ 2k, which is impossible, since
n ≤ k.
(b) Assume by contradiction that an equilibrium x∗ exists. If x∗i = v0 for all i ∈ N , then
each player gains k/n < 1, so a profitable deviation is possible.
We consider now the case where for some i ∈ N we have xi 6= v0.
First we consider the case k < n < 2k. If for some i ∈ N we have x∗i 6= v0, then, by
Lemma 5.10(d), each ray contains 2 players in the same position, so 2k players choose an
action different from v0, which is impossible since n < 2k.
If n = 2k, and for some i ∈ N we have x∗i 6= v0, then, like in the previous case, by
Lemma 5.10(d), x∗i 6= v0 for all i ∈ N and, by Lemma 5.11, d(x
∗
i , v0) is the same for all
i ∈ N . If d(x∗i , v0) < 1/2, then, for ε small enough, one player profits by choosing a position
at a distance d(x∗i , v0) + ε from v0. If d(x
∗
i , v0) ≥ 1/2, then one player profits by deviating in
v0.
Assume now 2k < n < 3k − 1. The profile where all the players choose v0 is not an
equilibrium. By Lemma 5.10(d), for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, there exist at least two players
ij,h(j)−1, ij,h(j) ∈ N
j such that d(x∗ij,h(j)−1 , vj) = d(x
∗
ij,h(j)
, vj) = ξ. The equilibrium action
of the remaining n − 2k players must be v0. If this were not the case, then, for some
j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, there would be three players on the edge j and
1 ≤ d(v0, x
∗
j,1) + d(x
∗
j,1, x
∗
j,h(j)) + d(x
∗
j,h(j), vj) = d(v0, x
∗
j,1) + 3ξ.
On the other hand, there are at most k− 2 remaining players, so there is an other edge with
only two players. This implies 1 = 3ξ, which is a contradiction. Therefore the remaining
k−2 players must be in v0. The payoff of every player i such that x
∗
i = v0 equals k/(3n−6k).
The payoff of every other player is 1/3 and therefore any of them would have an incentive
to deviate to v0, gaining k/(3n− 6k + 3) which is larger than 1/3 when n < 3k − 1.
(c) It is easy to prove that a profile x∗ where on each edge two players sit at a distance
2/3 from the origin and the remaining players sit at v0 is an equilibrium. We now show
uniqueness. Indeed we know from Lemma 5.10(c) that a profile where all players choose
v0 is not an equilibrium; moreover Lemma 5.10(d) implies that each edge has at least two
players. Using the same argument that we used in the proof of (b), we can show that no edge
can have three players if another edge has only two. By Lemma 5.10(a), at least one player
chooses v0, therefore it is not possible to have three players on each edge, if n ∈ {3k−1, 3k}.
Hence all remaining players are in v0.
(d) We now assume n ≥ 3k + 1. Let n = mk + r be the Euclidean division of n by k. We
will construct an equilibrium x∗ with m players on each edge and r players in the center,
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like in Figure 8. Let (2m− 3)ξ + y = 1. This profile is indeed an equilibrium if and only if
the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) None of the r players in v0 has an incentive to deviate to an interval of length 2ξ,
that is, for all i ∈ N such that x∗i = v0, we have ρi(x
∗) = ky/(2r) ≥ ξ, which implies
y ≥ 2rξ/k.
(ii) No player has an incentive to deviate to v0. Given that ρi(x
∗) ≥ ξ for all i ∈ N such
that x∗i 6= v0, we have ky/(2r + 2) ≤ ξ, which implies y ≤ 2(r + 1)ξ/k.
(iii) No player has an incentive to deviate to an interval of length y, that is y ≤ 2ξ.
(iv) No player has an incentive to deviate to a location with another single player. If she
did, her payoff would be either ξ or
ξ
2
+
y
4
≤ ξ.
Then, for any ξ such that
k
2(r + 1) + 2km− 3k
≤ ξ ≤
k
2r + 2km− 3k
the profile x∗ is an equilibrium. Hence the game has an infinite number of pure Nash
equilibria.
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